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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 002620

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015

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SUBJECT: BIC-IV: (U) MEETING ON ISSUES RELATED TO  
TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS, OCTOBER 27, 2005

REF: 04 GENEVA 1027 (BIC-I-003)

Classified By: DAS Karin L. Look, U.S. Representative  
to the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC).  
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (d).

1. (U) This is BIC-IV-004.
2. (U) Meeting Date: October 27, 2005  
Time: 3:00 - 3:45 P.M.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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3. (C) As a measure to improve transparency and confidence-building, Russia repackaged its proposal (originally made in BIC-I on April 9, 2004, REFTEL) to sub-aggregate strategic nuclear warhead data. Russia proposed that, in addition to providing the total number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads that is already reported in each side's briefings on its strategic forces, the sides should also report sub-aggregated numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warhead data for ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers at each base. Alternatively, if the United States cannot agree to provide the positional data, then perhaps the sides could agree to provide the sub-aggregated numbers for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. The Russian Delegation stated that the focus of Russia's proposal was to obtain a clear picture of Moscow Treaty (MT) implementation. The U.S. Delegation restated the U.S. position that providing additional information in the BIC was unnecessary, but said that it would report this proposal to Washington.

4. (C) In reference to the Russian Aide-Memoire on strategic stability of September 20, 2005, Russia stressed that the question of our future strategic relationship is an important issue and noted that the expiration of the START Treaty had provided the impetus behind Russia's Aide Memoire. The sides need to cooperate to work through these important issues. There would be a new administration in 2009; therefore, it is important to examine these issues now. The U.S. side noted that the United States was considering the Aide-Memoire, but added that we are still four years away from the expiration of START.

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RUSSIA OUTLINES RE-PACKAGED  
APPROACH TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING  
AND TRANSPARENCY  
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5. (C) Ul'yanov stated that, in the Joint Declaration of May 24, 2002, the Presidents of Russia and the United States had stated that the START Treaty provides the foundation for providing confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures to be agreed. This statement should be a direct assignment to both delegations of the BIC by the Presidents of the United States and Russia. He said that it was unfortunate that the amount of data provided under the MT was much less than the amount of information that was provided under the START Treaty. Furthermore, he believed that the sides were more transparent at the end of the Cold War than they are now, and that this approach should not continue in this new era of partnership.

6. (C) As a way forward, Ul'yanov said that the sides should focus on enhancing transparency. Thus, Russia proposed that the sides provide additional sub-aggregated strategic nuclear warhead data in the strategic forces briefings to improve transparency and confidence-building measures related to reporting numbers of such warheads under the MT. Russia proposed that, in addition to providing the total number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads that was already reported

in each side's briefings on its strategic forces, the sides should also report sub-aggregated numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warhead data for ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers at each base. Alternatively, if the United States cannot agree to provide the positional data, then perhaps the sides could agree to provide the sub-aggregated numbers for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Ul'yanov stated that such an exchange of data would not include verification measures, and that Russia is flexible regarding the form of the agreement. Russia's past proposal was for an exchange of letters, however, now Russia believes this could be based on each side's mutual understanding. He concluded that the focus of Russia's proposal was to obtain a clear picture of MT implementation.

17. (C) Look stated that it has been a long-standing U.S. position that it is unnecessary to provide additional data for reporting strategic nuclear warheads under the MT -- that position has not changed. The U.S. focus is on cooperative, informal approaches that are reciprocal, but not necessarily symmetrical, that do not require negotiations and agreements.

Look also disagreed with Ul'yanov about his comparison between the MT and the START Treaty with the types and amount of data that was provided. She said that information provided under the START Treaty was not provided out of generosity or openness. It was required to be provided because of strict Treaty provisions developed because of the nature of our Cold War relationship. In contrast, under the MT, which grew out of, and is part of a changed U.S.-Russian relationship, information is offered, not required, and the mechanism for providing information is one of briefings and dialogue. Look, commenting on the Russian side's repeated focus on transparency for the MT, said that since we are now several years into implementing the MT and are closing in on the end date of the START Treaty (December 5, 2009), it was probably more important to look to the future, as Russia had outlined in its September 20, 2005 Aide-Memoire, rather than try to improve the past.

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RUSSIA'S AIDE-MEMOIRE: WHAT  
SHOULD WE DO AFTER START EXPIRES?  
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18. (C) Ul'yanov stated that, with respect to future dialogue, the START Treaty currently allows each Party to view, with some degree of certainty, what the other side was doing with its strategic forces. He asked whether the United States had considered how it would address openness and transparency after December 5, 2009. Look said that the United States had not yet formally considered this issue. However, she noted that the United States was considering Russia's September 20 Aide-Memoire. Look said that, in her view, Russia had asked the right question in its Aide-Memoire; i.e., where do the sides go from here with our strategic relationship? She said that the United States is considering how to answer the question. She also said that Russia's Aide-Memoire also indicates to her that Russia did not have answers to these questions at this point either. She said that although, in her view, we need to work to find those answers, there is no sense of urgency as to when the answers are needed.

19. (C) Ul'yanov said that Look was quite right in stating that Russia did not have answers to questions beyond 2009. He suggested that both the United States and Russia as partners should work together to seek the answers. He said that it may be easier to come up with the answers to these questions separately at the higher levels of our governments, but he said he did not believe that this was the right approach. He said that the right approach was one of cooperation among the two sides. As to Look's point on the lack of urgency, Ul'yanov pointed out that there will be Presidential elections in both Russia and the United States before the end of START. The elections would have a significant impact on our work, and it was important to address these questions now. The new administrations would not be focusing on questions related to the end of the START Treaty, there would be bigger issues for the new administrations to consider. Therefore, the sooner we began the dialogue on the way forward on this question, the better chance we have to end our dialogue in a more fruitful way.

110. (C) Look said she believes that a U.S.-Russia dialogue should not be focused on the expiration of START. Ul'yanov said that the expiration of START provided the impetus for the Aide-Memoire, but the sides should, of course, focus on the broader relationship. Russia wants a serious dialogue. Look thanked Ul'yanov for his explanations and indicated she would report them to Washington.

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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS  
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111. (C) Ul'yanov said that, based on established tradition,

the sides should discuss the date for the next BIC meeting. Look said that, since she did not know who would be the U.S. Representative for the next session of the BIC, it was unfair to try to set a date now. However, in general, since the U.S. Report on the MT is due to the Senate on April 1st, perhaps sometime in the early spring could be used for initial planning purposes. Ul'yanov said that two meetings a year, one in the spring and one in the fall, seem right to him. He noted that the sides could finalize the date in diplomatic channels. By way of a summary of the session, Ul'yanov said this had not been an easy session but the dialogue had been good. However, he hoped that the sides could approach the next session by taking a closer look into finalizing the issues related to the definition and Russia's proposal for increased transparency. Look agreed with Ul'yanov's assessment of the dialogue at this session. She said that while there were some dead ends, there were also some possibilities for further fruitful discussions.

¶12. (U) Documents exchanged: None.

¶13. (U) Participants:

U.S.

DAS Look  
Mr. Buttrick  
Mr. Johnston  
Mr. Kuehne  
Mr. Mullins  
Mr. Siemon  
Mr. Singer  
Col Smith  
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Russia

Mr. Ul'yanov  
Gen Maj Artyukhin  
Mr. Artem'yev  
Col Fedorchenko  
Col Kamenskiy  
Amb Masterkov  
Mr. Mezhenyy  
Ms. Sorokina  
Ms. Vodopolova  
Col Zaytsev  
Mr. Gusev (Int)

¶14. (U) Look sends.  
Moley